Many emerging applications in both wired and wireless networks, such as information dissemination and distributed collaboration in an adversarial environment, need support of secure group communications. There have been many such schemes in the setting of wired networks. These schemes can be directly adopted in, or appropriately adapted to, the setting of wireless networks such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and sensor networks. In this paper we show that the popular group communication schemes that we have examined are vulnerable to the following attack: an outsider adversary who compromises a legitimate group member could obtain some or all past group keys as well as the current group key; this is in sharp contrast to the widelyaccepted belief that a such adversary can only obtain the current group key. This attack is very powerful also because it provides the adversary the following flexibility: since the adversary knows which members are the "most valuable" ones from its own perspective of view, compromise of any such member leads to the exposure of all the past and current group keys. This flexibility is particularly relevant in the setting of MANETs and sensor networks because they are typically deployed in a small area and the adversary can capture and compromise the easiest-to-obtain node. In order to deal with this powerful attack, we formalize two security models for stateful and stateless group communication schemes, respectively. We show that some practical methods can make a subclass of the group communication schemes immune to this attack at the following extra expense: at each rekeying event, a group member conducts logarithmically-many pseudorandom function evaluations.
INTRODUCTION
Secure group communications are useful in both wired and wireless networks. One important property of secure group communications is the assurance that only the legitimate members (or users, receivers) can have access to the multicast or broadcast data. For this purpose, there have been many secure group communication schemes in the setting of wired networks; popular ones include the stateful LKH [26, 25] and OFT [23, 2] as well as the stateless schemes (e.g., [20, 10] ). These schemes can be directly adopted in, or appropriately adapted to, the setting of wireless networks such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and sensor networks.
In this paper we show that these group communication schemes are subject to the following attack: an outsider adversary who compromises a legitimate group member could obtain some or all past group keys as well as the current group key (and thus the multicast data encrypted using these keys). This is in sharp contrast to the widely-accepted belief in these schemes that a such adversary can only obtain the current group key. This attack is very powerful also because it provides the adversary the following flexibility: since the adversary knows which members are the "most valuable" ones from its own perspective of view (see examples in Section 1.1), compromise of any such member leads to the exposure of all the past and current group keys. This flexibility is particularly relevant in the setting of MANETs and sensor networks because they are typically deployed in a small area and the adversary can capture and compromise the easiest-to-obtain node. unicast) the encryption of plaintext z using key w, namely the ciphertext {z}w.
Consider the simple scenario, as shown in Figure 1 .(a), of a group consisting of a key server s and users u1, . . . , u8. The server is responsible for initiating and maintaining the group in the presence of user joining and leaving. The keys are organized as a key tree, where the leaves are the users and the inner nodes are the keys. Moreover, each user holds the keys corresponding to the inner nodes on the path starting from the parent of the user and ending at the root. For example, in Figure 1 .(a), user u1 holds keys k1, k123, and k1−8, where k1−8 is the group key that can be used to encrypt the communications within the group. u1  u2  u3  u5  u4  u6  u7  u8   k1  k2  k3  k4  k5  k6  k7  k8   k1-9   k456  k123  k789   u9   k9   u1  u2  u3  u5  u4  u6  u7   k1  k2  k3  k4  k5  k6  k7 k1-7,9 k456 k123 k7,9 u9 k9 (a) initial key tree (b) key tree after u9 joined (c) key tree after u8 left
Figure 1: A simple scenario with a possible attack
Because the group is dynamic, meaning that some users join the group while some users leave it. In order to maintain secure communications, each join or leave would require the key server to change some keys that also need to be securely distributed to certain users (via some rekeying messages). Ignoring for a moment certain details such as authorization of joining the group and authentication of the messages sent by the key server, in what follows we explain how the key server responds to a group dynamics.
After granting a join request from user u9, server s shares a key k9 with user u9. Besides, certain keys need to be changed and sent to the corresponding users . As shown in Figure 1 .(b), in order to prevent u9 from accessing past communications, the key k78 and k1−8 are changed to k789 and k1−9, respectively. Moreover, k789 and k1−9 need to be securely sent to users u7, u8, and u9. One efficient way to do this is the following algorithm (which corresponds to the so-called group-oriented rekeying strategy):
s → {u1, . . . , u8} : {k1−9} k 1−8 , {k789} k 78 s → {u9}
: {k1−9, k789} k 9
Now, suppose u8 leaves. To prevent u8 from accessing future communications, as shown in Figure 1 .(c), server s needs to change the keys k1−9 and k789 to new keys k1−7,9 and k7,9, respectively. Moreover, k1−7,9 and k7,9 need to be securely sent to users u7 and u9, and k1−7,9 needs to be securely sent to users u1, . . . , u6. One efficient way to do this is the following algorithm (which also corresponds to the group-oriented rekeying strategy):
Suppose now an adversary compromises user u9. It is of course true that the adversary is always able to obtain the current group key k1−7,9, no matter how the group rekeying scheme works. However, the adversary who has recorded the network traffic is also able to obtain the group key k1−9, because it can decrypt the message incurred by the event that u9 joins the group
As a consequence, the adversary can decrypt both the communications encrypted using group keys k1−9 and k1−7,9. This is in sharp contrast to the desired property that the adversary can decrypt only the communications encrypted using group key k1−7,9. We notice that the above attack is not fundamentally related to the group-oriented rekeying strategy, or to the fact that u8 -the sibling of the newly joined user u9 -leaves the group. We also notice that the above attack is not fundamentally related to the fact that u9 is a recently joined node. For example, suppose group dynamics is incurred by some users belonging to {u4, u5, u6, u7, u8, u9}, then it is possible that k123 is always used to encrypt the new group keys so that u1, u2, and u3 can obtain them. As a consequence, u1, u2, and u3 are the "most valuable" users from the adversary's perspective of view, and compromising any of them will enable the adversary to recover all the past and current group keys.
The LKH+ [24] , which was seemingly motivated from an efficiency perspective, resolves only piece of the problem because the above attack remains effective when the group dynamics are incurred by leaving events.
In summary, it is clear that the past group keys, which were ever encrypted using any of the keys held by a user that is being corrupt, are exposed. Under the extreme circumstance that the newly corrupt node holds the keys that have been used to encrypt all the past group keys, all the past and current group keys are compromised. This extreme scenario could occur because the adversary knows which nodes are "most valuable" ones from its own perspective of view. Vulnerability of the One-way Function Tree (OFT) Scheme: The OFT [23, 2] is a stateful group communication scheme. The basic idea underlying the OFT scheme is the following. The center maintains a binary tree, each node x of which is associated with two cryptographic keys, a node key kx and a blinded node key k x = g(kx), where g is an appropriate one-way function. Every leaf of the tree is associated with a group member, and the center assigns a randomly chosen key kx to each member x. Let f be a "mixing" function (e.g., ⊕). The interior node keys are defined by the rule
where lef t(u) and right(u) are the left and right children of the node u, respectively. This way, the node key associated with the root of the tree is the group key. In order for a member u to derive the group key, the center (or server, sender) sends the blinded node keys of nodes adjacent to the nodes on (i.e., of the nodes "hanging" off) the path from u to the root.
When a new member joins the group, an existing leaf node u is split, the member associated with u is now associated with lef t(u), and the new member is associated with right(u). Both members are given new keys. The new blinded node keys that have been changed are securely sent to the appropriate subgroups of members.
When the member associated with a node u is evicted from the group, the member assigned to the sibling of u is reassigned to the parent p of u and given a new leaf key. If the sibling s of u is the root of a subtree, then p becomes s, moving the subtree closer to the root, and one of the leaves of this subtree is given a new key. The new blinded node keys are securely sent to the appropriate subgroups of members.
Now we show why the OFT scheme is also vulnerable to a similar attack. The key observation is that whenever there is a change to any blinded node key, the center needs to securely send the new blinded node keys to certain other legitimate nodes. It seems any reasonable method would be based on the keys possessed by the respective nodes (e.g., u). Since u can derive the new group key after receiving the rekeying message, an outsider adversary could use the following strategy to recover this group key: it first records the rekeying message, and then breaks into u's computer after the next rekeying event (assuming that u is still legitimate). Moreover, the "most valuable" members, from the adversary's perspective of view, are those who have never been evicted.
Vulnerability of the stateless subset-cover framework: Naor et al. [20] presented the first practical stateless group communication scheme, which has its roots in broadcast encryption [8] . Compared with the stateful group communication schemes discussed above, stateless schemes have the nice feature that they do not assume the receivers (or users, members) being always on-line. Since the receivers do not necessarily update their state from session to session, stateless schemes are especially good for applications over lossy channels (e.g., MANETs and sensor networks).
Let N be the set of all users, R ⊂ N be a group of |R| = r users whose decryption privileges should be revoked, EL and FK be two appropriate symmetric key cryptosystems. The goal of a stateless group communication scheme is to allow a center to transmit a message M to all users such that any user u ∈ N \R can decrypt the message correctly, while even a coalition consisting of all members of R cannot decrypt it. Suppose S1, . . . , Sw are a collection of subsets of users, where Sj ⊆ N for 1 ≤ j ≤ w, and each Sj is assigned a long-lived key Lj such that each u ∈ Sj should be able to deduce Lj from its secret information Iu. Given a revoked set R, if one 1. Find ij such that u ∈ Si j (in the case u ∈ R the result is null).
2. Extract the corresponding key Li j from Iu.
3. Decrypt Cj using key Li j to obtain K.
4. Decrypt C using key K to obtain the message M .
The subset-cover framework has a vulnerability similar to the one against the stateful group schemes. Specifically, suppose an adversary A / ∈ N records all the encrypted communications over the channels. If A breaks into a legitimate user u ∈ N at a later point of time, then A obtains Iu, which allows it to recover the Li j (and thus the encrypted M ) that u was entitled to obtain. In the extreme case that u has never been revoked (i.e., u is one of the "most valuable" users), A can recover all the past and current keys that have been used to encrypt messages.
Our Contributions
We trace the above vulnerability of group communication schemes back to that their security models (if any) are not sufficient. We formalize two adversarial models. One is called the passive attack model, in which the adversary is passive in the sense that it is only allowed to join and leave the group in an arbitrary fashion, but not allowed to corrupt any legitimate members. This model has seemingly been implicitly adopted in the existing group communication literature. The other more realistic one is called the active outsider attack model, in which the adversary is further allowed to corrupt legitimate members. This model helps understand and deal with the aforementioned attack. In each of the two models, we define two security notions, namely forward-security meaning that the revoked or evicted members, even if they collude, cannot obtain the future group keys, and backward-security meaning that a newly admitted member cannot obtain the past group keys.
1 This allows us to obtain the following interesting results about the relationships between these security notions, which are equally applicable to both stateful and stateless group communication schemes.
1. Backward-security in the active outsider attack model (also called strong-security for short) is strictly stronger than forward-security in the active outsider attack model (also called security for short). This means that in the active outsider attack model one only needs to prove the backward-security property.
2. Backward-security in the passive attack model is equivalent to forward-security in the passive attack model.
3. Backward-security in the active outsider attack model (i.e., strong-security) is strictly stronger than backwardsecurity in the passive attack model. However, we do not know whether forward-security in active outsider attack model is also strictly stronger than its counterpart in the passive attack model (we only know that when the adversary is static they are equivalent).
4. The security achieved in existing group communication schemes (e.g., [26, 23, 20, 10] ) is indeed, as we will show, forward-security in the active outsider attack model (i.e., security). This has become clear only until now because there were no formal models specified before (in spite of the fact that the passive attack model has seemingly been implicitly adopted in the literature). The achieved security property is at least as strong as what we call backward-security in the passive attack model, but strictly weaker than what we call backward-security in the active outsider attack model (i.e., strong-security) -a property that dismisses the attack discussed above.
Besides the above general results, we show that some practical methods can transform a subclass of the group communication schemes (including LKH [26, 25] , LKH+ [24] , and the complete subtree method [20] ) into ones that achieve the desired strong-security (i.e., backward-security in the active outsider attack model). The methods are based on two general compilers. The extra complexity imposed by the compilers is that at each rekeying event a group member conducts logarithmically-many pseudorandom function evaluations. This should not jeopardize their utility even in the setting of MANETs and sensor networks, as pseudorandom functions may be implemented with block ciphers in practice. We also present instantiations of the compilers, which lead to concrete schemes that achieve the desired strong-security.
Although the technical means underlying the transformation is to evolve the keys based on a secure pseudorandom function family -an idea inspired by [4] , there are some subtle issues in our security models. First, we must allow the adversary to corrupt some group keys that are used to encrypt the communications before the rekeying message of interest. Of course, the corrupt members must have been revoked before this rekeying message. On the other hand, in [4] no such corruption is allowed before the event of interest. Second, from an adversary's perspective of view, there could be many "most valuable" users (i.e., an intelligent adversary only needs to select the easiest-to-obtain one) to compromise in our setting. Whereas, no such flexibility is given to the adversary in the setting of [4] .
Related Work
The WGL scheme was independently invented in [25] . Both schemes are sometimes called Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH). Although these schemes are mainly invented for secure multicast applications, we believe that many other applications can utilize such a scheme; we refer the reader to [21, 6] for a survey, including the relationship between the schemes of [26, 25] and the schemes of [8, 20] . We notice that the stateless schemes (e.g., [20, 10] ) are perhaps more useful in an environment of lossy channels. Although the LKH scheme has been extended in several directions, these extensions are motivated to improve performance rather than to achieve strictly stronger security. For example, performance can be improved by periodic group rekeying [22] or batch rekeying [17] , and improved trade-offs between storage and communication are available in [7, 6, 19] . Nevertheless, these techniques may also be utilized in our strongly-secure group communication schemes. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first one that identifies a new and realistic attack, and presents solutions to (a subclass of) the popular group communication schemes. The variant presented in [24] (which is also known as LKH+) is similar to our performance optimization that the communication complexity incurred by joining events can be substantially reduced. However, there was no formal treatment of the utilized key evolvement, nor was their scheme resistant against the attack introduced in Section 1.1.
While secure group-oriented communications have been intensively investigated in the setting of wired networks, their counterparts in the setting of wireless networks are yet to be thoroughly explored. Although the aforementioned schemes can be directly deployed in wireless settings, a simple-minded adoption may not lead to the desired performance (see, e.g., [28, 15] ). Fortunately, there have been some interesting investigations that show that these schemes can be adapted (e.g., by taking into account some physical characteristics of ad hoc networks [16, 14, 13, 15] ) so that better performance can be achieved. One of the practical values of the present paper is that the significantly improved security guarantee in the popular group communication schemes can be seamlessly integrated into the methods for improving performance [16, 14, 13, 15] . Indeed, our schemes can be easily integrated into any other methods for improving performance to achieve better security, as long as the methods assume "black-box" access to an underlying security group communication scheme. There have been few other attempts at securing group communications in such settings. [12] presented a scheme for secure multicast communications in MANETs based on public key cryptosystems. In contrast, we consider only symmetric key cryptosystems based group communication schemes. Yet another approach to secure group communication scheme was initiated in [28] , which is partially stateless. Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review some cryptographic preliminaries. In Section 3 we present formal models and security definitions of stateful group communication schemes, as well as the relationships between the security notions. In Section 4 we present a compiler for stateful group communication schemes and investigate its properties. The compiler is utilized in Section 5 to derive a concrete strongly-secure stateful group communication scheme out of the secure WGL scheme, which is reviewed in Appendix A for com-pleteness. We conclude the paper in Section 6. Due to space limitation, we leave most of the details as well as the full exploration of the stateless case to the full version of the present paper [27] .
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRELIMINARIES
A function : N → R + is negligible if ∀c ∃κc s.t. ∀κ > κc, we have (κ) < 1/κ c . We will base security of group communication schemes on the security of pseudorandom function families. A pseudorandom function (PRF) family {f k } parameterized by a secret value k ∈R {0, 1} κ has the following property [9] : A probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A has only a negligible (in κ) advantage in distinguishing f k from a perfect random function (with the same domain and range). It is well-known that pseudorandom functions can be naturally used to construct symmetric key encryption schemes that are secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (which suffices our treatment of the WGL scheme). Informally, this means that no adversary is able to learn any significant information about the encrypted content. We refer the reader to [11] for a thorough treatment on this subject. 
MODEL AND DEFINITION OF STATEFUL GROUP COMMUNICATION SCHEMES

Model
Let κ be a security parameter, and ID be the set of possible group members (i.e., users, receivers, or principals) such that |ID| is polynomially-bounded in κ. There is a special entity called a Group Controller (i.e., key server, center, server, or sender), denoted by GC, such that GC / ∈ ID. Since a stateful group communication scheme is driven by "rekeying" events (because of joining or leaving operations below), it is convenient to treat the events occur at "virtual time" t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., because the group controller is able to maintain such an execution history. This indeed accommodates the following important two cases: (1) all the parties periodically update their keys, even if there are no joining or leaving operations -this is relevant when a scheme achieves what we call strong-security specified below; (2) the lengths of the time periods do not have to be the same -this is the case when the rekeying events occur in an arbitrary fashion. At time t, let ∆ (t) denote the set of legitimate group members,
GC the set of keys held by GC, K
U the set of keys held by U ∈ ∆ (t) , acc
U the state indicating whether U ∈ ∆ (t) has successfully received the rekeying message.
Initially, ∀ U ∈ ID, t ∈ N, set acc
U ← false. We assume that GC treat joining and leaving operation separately (e.g., first fulfilling the leaving operation and then immediately the joining one), even if the requests are made simultaneously. This strategy has indeed been adopted in the group communication literature.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that during the system initialization (i.e., Setup below) GC can communicate with each legitimate member U through an authenticated private channel. In practice, this assumption can be implemented with a two-party authenticated key-exchange protocol. Further, we assume that GC can establish a common secret, if needed, with a joining user, and that after the system initialization GC can communicate with any U ∈ ID through an authenticated channel. These assumptions can be implemented with a digital signature scheme [26] , and digital signatures are sometimes necessary [5] .
Although we will not make any synchronization assumption about the underlying communication model, which could therefore be asynchronous [18] . However, known practical schemes (e.g., [26, 25, 7] ) assume reliable delivery, which would require some (loose) clock synchronization.
A group communication scheme has the following components:
Setup: The group controller GC generates a set of keys K (0) GC , and distributes them to the current group members (that may be determined by the adversary), ∆ (0) ⊆ ID, through the authenticated private channels. (In the case that some users were corrupted before this setup procedure, we may let the adversary select the keys held by the corrupt users.) Each member Ui ∈ ∆ (0) holds a set of keys denoted by
GC , and there is a key, k (0) that is common to all the current members, namely
Join: This algorithm is executed by group controller GC at time, say, t due to some join request(s) (we abstract away the out-of-band authentication and establishment of an individual key for each of the new members). It takes as input: (1) , and (4) keys held by group members, {K
It outputs updated system state information, including: (1) identities of new group members, ∆ (t) ←
GC , (3) new keys for new group members, {K
, which are somehow sent to the legitimate users through the authenticated channels (depending on concrete schemes), (4) new group key
Leave: This algorithm is executed by the group controller GC at time, say, t due to leave or revocation operation(s). It takes as input: (1) (t) , which are somehow sent to the legitimate users through the authenticated channels (depending on concrete schemes), (4) new group key
Rekey: This algorithm is executed by the legitimate group members at some time t, namely all Ui ∈ ∆ (t) where ∆ (t) is derived from a Join or Leave event. In other words, Ui ∈ ∆ (t) runs this algorithm upon receiving the message from GC over the authenticated channel. The algorithm takes as input the received message and Ui's secrets, and is supposed to output the updated keys for the group member. If the execution of the algorithm is successful, Ui sets: (1) acc
is supposed to be the new group key.
If the rekeying event is incurred by a Join event, every Ui ∈ ∆ (t) erases K (although a corrupt one does not have to follow this protocol).
We require that any group communication scheme satisfy the following correctness: for any t = 1, 2, . . . and ∀ U ∈ ∆ (t) , if acc
Security Definitions
We consider an adversary that has complete control over all the communications in the network. To simplify the definition, we assume that the group controller is never compromised; this is not necessarily a restriction because the adversary could have compromised all the group members (and thus have obtained the secrets the group controller holds).
An adversary's interaction with principals in the network is modeled by allowing it to have access to (some of) the following oracles:
• O Send (U, t, M, action): Send a message M to U ∈ {GC} ∪ ID at time t ≥ 0, and output its reply, where action ∈ {Setup, Join, Leave, Rekey} meaning that U will execute according to the corresponding protocol, and M specifies the needed information for executing the protocol. Of course, the query of type Setup is only made at time t = 0.
• O Reveal (U, t): Output group key held by U ∈ ∆ (t) at time t, namely k
U .
• In each of the two models, we define two security notions: backward-security and forward-security. 
Definition 3.3. (security) Intuitively, it means that A learns no information about a group key if (1) with respect to the corresponding rekeying event there is no corrupt legitimate member (this implicitly implies that all the members that were corrupted by A must have been revoked), and (2) no member is corrupted by
On the Relationships between the Security Notions
We summarize the relationships between the security notions of stateful group communication schemes in Fig. 2 , 
A COMPILER
Suppose {f k } is a secure pseudorandom function family. Now we present a compiler that transforms a secure group communication scheme SGC = (Setup, Join, Leave, Rekey) into a strongly-secure group communication scheme SSGC = (Setup * , Join * , Leave * , Rekey * ). The compiler applies to the subclass of stateful group communication schemes where the different keys belong to K
are computationally independent of each other, where t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In what follows "a key k needs to be changed" means that it should be substituted with a random key that is informationtheoretically independent of k.
Setup
* : This is the same as SGC.Setup.
This algorithm is executed by GC at time, say, t. Let K be the set of keys that need to be changed (including the group key k (t−1) ), K * be the set of common key(s) shared between the GC and the joining user(s), and K * * be the new keys (including the new group key k (t) ) that are used to replace the keys in K.
1. Execute SGC.Join except for the following: (1) let f k i (0) play the role of the corresponding key ki, where ki ∈ (K
} is used as an encryption key in SGC.Join, let f k i (0) play the role of ki.
Every individual key ki ∈ (K
Leave * : This algorithm is executed by GC at time, say, t. Let K be the set of keys that need to be changed (including the group key k (t−1) ) or eliminated, and K * * be the new keys (including the new group key k (t) ) that are used to replace (possibly a subset of) the keys in K.
1. Execute SGC.Leave except for the following: (1) let f k i (0) play the role of the corresponding key ki, where ki ∈ K
} is used as an encryption key in SGC.Leave, let f k i (0) play the role of ki.
Rekey * : There are two cases.
• The rekeying event is incurred by a Leave event at time t. In this case, every honest leaving user should erase all the secrets as in SGC.Rekey, and every remaining user, V ∈ ∆ (t) , executes the fol-
the subset of keys that need to be changed to a set of new keys K V . (We notice that both K V and K V can be derived by V after receiving the rekeying message and that k (t) ∈ K V .) First, V executes SGC.Rekey except for letting f k i (0) play the role of ki under the circumstance that ki ∈ K
} is used as an encryption key, and updates every ki ∈ (K
V erases the outdated keys (other than K (t) V ) as in SGC.Rekey.
• The rekeying event is incurred by a Join event at time t. We notice that user V ∈ ∆ (t) holds a set of keys K (t−1) V (in the case of V being a joining user, K (t−1) V consists of the only common key between GC and V ), of which a subset K V of keys (which may be empty) are to be changed to a set of new keys K V . (We notice that both K V and K V can be derived by V after receiving the rekeying message and that k (t) ∈ K V .) First, V executes SGC.Rekey except for letting f k i (0) play the role of ki under the circumstance that ki ∈ K
erases the outdated keys (other than K (t) V ) as in SGC.Rekey.
Analysis
First we analyze the complexity of SSGC.
• It does not introduce any extra communication complexity over SGC; this is important in many applications such as MANETs and sensor networks.
• It does not introduce any extra storage complexity over SGC, provided that the temporary storage for the keys such as f k i (0) is insignificant. • The only extra complexity of SSGC over SGC is the evaluation of the pseudorandom functions. Specifically, the server needs to conduct O(max{|K
GC |}) pseudorandom function evaluation operations; a user V needs to conduct O(max{|K
U |}) pseudorandom function operations. We notice that typically typically |K
GC |)) (e.g., [26] ). Theorem 4.1. Assume {f k } is a secure pseudorandom function family (as specified in Section 2) . If SGC is secure, then SSGC is strongly-secure.
Performance Optimization
In this section we show how to reduce the communication complexity in the SSGC; this might be very useful in applications such as MANETs and sensor networks. Suppose a Join event occurs at time t. The key observation includes:
1. In Join * of SSGC we could simply let the server sends the updated keys to the joining user U . We notice that, before U receiving the rekeying message from the server, K (t−1) U consists of a single key, denoted by k * , that is also known to the server. After sending the rekeying message, the server update
When the joining user U executes Rekey * corresponding to the Join * (i.e., after receiving the rekeying message), it lets f k * (0) plays the role of k * . Then, U updates k * to f k * (1) while keeping intact the other keys received from the server.
3. When an existing user V ∈ ∆ (t−1) executes Rekey * corresponding to the Join * , it simply updates every
(including the group key) to f k i (1).
The encryption of group communications is based on new group key k
We notice that the idea of substituting ki via a certain function was pointed out in [24, 7] with respect to the specific scheme of [26] . Here we show that it can actually be extended to accommodate the class of group communication schemes discussed in this paper. This justifies why we treat it as a possible feature of the compiler, which we call optimized compiler. 
A CONCRETE STRONGLY-SECURE GROUP
COMMUNICATION SCHEME
The WGL Model
The WGL model is best known as a key tree, which outperforms the others (e.g., star key graph, or general key graph which actually leads to a certain NP-hard problem as we always need to minimize the communication complexity). A key tree T can be seen as a special class of directed acyclic graph with two types of nodes: u-nodes representing users and k-nodes representing keys. Each u-node is a leaf that has one outgoing edge but no incoming edge, and each k-node is an inner node that has one or more incoming edges. Moreover, there is a k-node (i.e., the root) that has incoming edges but no outgoing edge.
Let U be a finite and nonempty set of users and K be a finite and nonempty set of keys. We are interested in a relation, R ⊆ U × K, that can be specified by a key tree T as follows:
• There is a one-to-one correspondence between U and the set of u-nodes in T .
• There is a one-to-one correspondence between K and the set of k-nodes in T .
• (u, k) ∈ R if and only if T has a directed path from the u-node that corresponds to a user u ∈ U to the k-node that corresponds to a key k ∈ K.
This means that the group key is at the root of the tree, which is shared by all the users in U . Since a key tree can be specified by two parameters -the height h of the tree is the length (in number of edges) of the longest directed path in the tree, and the degree d of the tree is the maximum number of incoming edges of a node in the tree -each user in U has at most h keys. In order to clarify the presentation, we define two functions, keyset : U → K and userset : K → U , as follows:
Intuitively, keyset(u) is the set of keys held by user u ∈ U , and userset(k) is the set of users that hold key k ∈ K. Moreover, it is natural to generalize the definition of keyset(u ∈ U ) to keyset(U ⊆ U ) = ∀ u∈U keyset(u), and the definition of userset(k ∈ K) to userset(K ⊆ K) = ∀ k∈K userset(k).
The Scheme
The new scheme is obtained by applying the compiler described in Section 4 to the WGL scheme based on the socalled group-oriented rekeying strategy, which is reviewed in Appendix A for completeness. (The WGL scheme can be based on the less efficient key-oriented and user-oriented strategies [26] . Nevertheless, it should be straightforward to adapt our scheme to these rekeying strategies.) The resulting scheme consists of four protocols, namely SSGC = (Setup * , Join * , Leave * , Rekey * ).
The key server generates a key ki for each k-node. After the initialization, each user (corresponding to a unode) holds the keys corresponding to the path from its parent k-node to the root. Join * : After granting a join request from user u, the key server s creates a new u-node for user u and a new k-node for its individual key ku. Then, server s finds an existing k-node (called the joining point for this join request) in the key tree and attaches the k-node ku to the joining point as its child. As a consequence, the keys corresponding to the path -starting at the joining point and ending at the root -need to be changed. The algorithm is specified below:
Join protocol for group-oriented rekeying:
// suppose user u joins the group server s generates a new key ku for user u server s finds a joining point xj server s attaches ku to xj let x0 be the root suppose xi−1 is the parent of xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j kj+1 ← ku letk0,k1, . FOR allk ∈ (keyset(userset(k0)) \ {k0,k1, . . . ,kj}) ∪{kj+1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,kj } k ← fk (1) Leave * : After granting a leave request from user u, the key server s updates the key tree by deleting the u-node for user u and the k-node for its individual key from the key tree. The parent of the k-node corresponding to the user's individual key is called the leaving point. As a consequence, the keys corresponding to the path -starting at the leaving point and ending at the root -need to be changed. The algorithm is specified below:
Leave protocol for group-oriented rekeying:
// suppose u leaves the group let xj+1 be the deleted k-node for kū kj+1 ← ku server s finds the leaving point xj (parent of ku) server s removeskj+1 from the key tree let x0 be the root suppose xi−1 is the parent of xi where 1 ≤ i ≤ j letk0,k1, . . . ,kj be the keys of x0, x1, . . . , xj // they need to be changed server s generates fresh keysk0,k1, . . . ,kj as the new keys of x0, x1, . . . , xj (k0)) \ {k0,k1, . . . , kj+1}) ∪ {k1, . . . ,kj} k ← fk (1) Rekey * : If the rekeying event is incurred by a join event, a legitimate user (i.e., an existing one or a joining one) obtains a subset Θ of Θ = {k0,k1, . . . ,kj}, and updates eachk ∈ Θ \{k0} to fk (1) . If the rekeying event is incurred by a leave event, a legitimate user (i.e., one remaining in the group) obtains a subset Θ of Θ = {k0,k1, . . . ,kj}, and updates eachk ∈ Θ \ {k0} to fk (1) . In any case, a legitimate user u updates each ki ∈ keyset(u) to f k i (1), as long as ki is not changed to any key belonging to Θ, and erases the outdated keys. 
Analysis
CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We showed that a class of existing group communication schemes, both stateful and stateless alike, are vulnerable to a realistic severe attack. We presented formal models that allow us to capture the desired security properties, and explore the relationships between the security notions. We showed how some methods can make a subclass of existing schemes immune to the attack at a very small extra cost. An interesting open question is to make other schemes (e.g., the stateful [23, 2] and the stateless [10] ) secure against the attack without imposing any significant extra complexity.
